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Abstract Starting in 2014, the Affordable Care Act transformed the market for 
individual health insurance by changing how insurance is sold and by subsidizing 
coverage for millions of new purchasers. Insurers, who had no previous experience 
under these market conditions, competed actively but faced uncertainty in how 
to price their products. This issue brief uses newly available data to understand 
how health insurers fared financially during the ACA’s first year of full reforms. 
Overall, health insurers’ financial performance began to show some strain in 2014, 
but the ACA’s reinsurance program substantially buffered the negative effects for 
most insurers. Although a quarter of insurers did substantially worse than others, 
experience under the new market rules could improve the accuracy of pricing 
decisions in subsequent years.
BACKGROUND
The Affordable Care Act (ACA) created a dramatically different market-
place for individual health insurance through three key reforms: prohibit-
ing insurers from considering subscribers’ health status or risk; providing 
substantial subsidies for millions of people to purchase individual coverage, 
many for the first time in their lives; and creating an “exchange” structure 
that facilitates comparison shopping. In addition, the ACA limits the per-
centage of premiums that insurers can devote to profit and administrative 
expense and requires state or federal regulators to evaluate the basis for rate 
increases. 
Until recently, reports about the financial impact of these reforms 
on insurers had been largely positive. Stock values increased substantially 
ahead of broad market indices.1 A large number of participating insurers 
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created strong competition, both on and off the ACA exchanges.2 Finally, the full, unsubsidized prices 
in the individual insurance market have been favorable to subscribers, compared with the price of 
similarly comprehensive products in the group markets.3 
Recently, however, we are hearing more troubling financial news from health insurers in the 
individual market.4 Premium rates have increased more than expected.5 Several newly established 
insurers that focused on the individual market have failed or are in financial distress.6 And the nation’s 
largest insurer, United Healthcare, announced it would be withdrawing from most of the ACA’s 
exchange markets, based in part on its significant losses.7
This issue brief analyzes newly available data sources to better understand the financial per-
formance of health insurers under the ACA during 2014, the first year of full reforms. It is important 
to analyze financial performance comprehensively because isolated reports can be misleading: losses 
from one insurer can fail to reflect better-performing insurers. In addition, adverse reports based on 
preliminary data can overlook the offsetting effects of reinsurance and other buffering mechanisms 
that the ACA included to protect insurers from excessive losses.8
Using rate data from the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), this study 
compares actual to projected 2014 medical claims from ACA-compliant health plans. On average, 
we find that medical claims were only 2 percent higher than insurers first projected, after taking into 
account reinsurance payments. 
We also examine CMS’s medical loss ratio data, which reflects financial performance related 
to compliant and noncompliant plans, including payments from three risk-adjustment programs and 
advance cost-sharing. Using this information, we can summarize the financial performance of health 
insurers in the individual and group markets. Overall, within the individual market, health insurers 
incurred losses amounting to 4 percent of premiums while group insurers earned a profit of almost 
2.5 percent. 
In addition, we evaluate changes in profitability of 144 credible insurers (i.e., those with 
more than 1,000 members) prior to and after one year of full ACA reforms. We find that more than 
a third of them had either improved or remained profitable from 2013 to 2014; for the remainder, 
financial performance worsened. 
STUDY FINDINGS
Actual vs. Projected Claims
We begin by analyzing how insurers’ financial performance in the individual market compares with 
their original projections for 2014. Many insurers were eager to offer competitive rates in this newly 
subsidized market to benefit from the substantial growth in enrollment and premium revenues that 
was expected—and that, in fact, occurred, as further documented below. However, establishing initial 
rates under the newly reformed and greatly expanded individual market was particularly challeng-
ing for the first year, because insurers lacked actuarial experience under the ACA’s market conditions. 
Therefore, actuaries had to make various assumptions based on judgment and a certain amount of 
guesswork.9 In addition, after insurers filed their rates, President Obama changed the market condi-
tions by allowing insurers to continue to offer noncompliant policies to existing policyholders rather 
than requiring them to switch to new ACA policies. 
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Exhibit 1 compares insurers’ projected per-member-per-month (pmpm) medical expenses 
with actual medical claims for ACA-compliant individual coverage in 2014.10 Across the market, medi-
cal claims were 5.7 percent higher than projected ($429 vs. $406 pmpm). Some insurers did consider-
ably worse than others. The quartile of insurers with the highest claims (75th percentile) underesti-
mated their claims by an average of 35 percent, whereas the lowest-claim quartile projected their claims 
much more accurately, within 4 percent, on average, similar to the average claims underestimate of 6 
percent marketwide. This indicates that serious adverse experience was concentrated among a minority 
of insurers. We can expect the accuracy of insurers’ claims projections to improve in subsequent years, 
as insurers gain more actuarial experience with the new market dynamics.
Exhibit 1
Actual vs Projected Medical Claims, 2014 Individual Market
All costs are per member per month






Total Medical Claims 25th (lowest claims) $310.0 $297.0 $13.0 4.4%
 Mean $429.0 $406.0 $23.0 5.7%
 75th (highest claims) $718.0 $531.0 $187.0 35.2%
Reinsurance Credits 25th $27.0 $19.0 $8.0 42.1%
 Mean $43.0 $29.0 $14.0 48.3%
 75th $104.0 $38.0 $66.0 173.7%
Net Medical Claims 25th $283.0 $279.0 $4.0 1.4%
 Mean $386.0 $377.0 $9.0 2.4%
 75th $614.0 $493.0 $121.0 24.5%
Source: Authors’ analysis of data from the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, mean enrollment-weighted values within quartiles of  
total claims.
Reinsurance
Most of insurers’ underestimated claims in 2014 were offset by $7.9 billion in reinsurance payments 
for high-cost patients from the federal government. The reinsurance program helps insurers transition 
to the new market rules, using federal funds collected through an earmarked fee on all health insur-
ance, included self-funded plans, to pay a large portion of high-cost claims incurred in the individual 
market.11 
Insurance actuaries knew the reinsurance program would cover some of their companies’ 
claims, but they lacked precise data about how much they should expect to receive from the program. 
Ultimately, the reinsurance credits to insurers (net of fees that insurers paid) were almost 50 percent 
higher than insurers had originally estimated ($43 vs. $29 pmpm). These greater payments resulted in 
part because enrollees in ACA-compliant plans had more high-cost claims than first anticipated, but 
also because the federal government modified the reinsurance payment formula in mid-2014 to be 
more favorable to insurers. 
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Altogether, taking into account the higher reinsurance payments, insurers’ net medical claims 
for ACA-compliant individual coverage were only 2.4 percent higher than they originally projected 
($386 vs. $377 pmpm). Although gross claims were $23 greater than expected per member per 
month, reinsurance credits of $43—$14 higher than expected—made up over half this underesti-
mate. This resulted in net medical claims being only $9 per member per month more than insurers 
originally projected for ACA-compliant coverage in the 2014 individual market. However, overall 
performance net of reinsurance credits remained substantially lower in the worst (75th) quartile of 
the market. These insurers had an average $121 per member per month in underestimated claims 
expenses. 
In subsequent years, reinsurance payments are scheduled to decrease, because reinsurance 
is a transitional program designed to acclimate insurers to the new market environment. As insurers 
develop more relevant actuarial data on which to base rating projections, they may have less of a need 
to rely on reinsurance to buffer uncertain projections.
Profits and Overhead
Medical claims reveal only part of the picture of insurers’ financial performance. Also relevant is how 
the ACA affected their administrative expenses and premiums, as well as their resulting profit mar-
gins. To show this, we include data from insurers’ medical loss ratio (MLR) reports. The MLR is the 
percentage of premium that an insurer pays out in medical claims or devotes to quality improvement 
versus overhead administrative costs and profits. The ACA requires health insurers to maintain an 
MLR of at least 80 percent in the individual and small-group markets and of at least 85 percent in 
the large-group market. As part of this regulation, insurers are required to submit annual reports on 
their MLRs.
Based on MLR data, Exhibit 2 shows health insurers’ 2014 financial performance overall and 
also by individual versus group markets, compared with the two previous years prior to full ACA mar-
ket reforms.12 These data include all regulated health insurance, both ACA-compliant and “grandfa-
thered” noncompliant coverage. There are several noteworthy points. 
First, the ACA almost doubled insurers’ premium revenue in the individual market, which 
increased by 97 percent, reflecting the considerable increase in enrollment brought about by the 
law’s subsidies and market reforms. Overall, health insurers’ premium revenues increased 6.2 percent, 
including group enrollment. This indicates that employer sponsorship of health insurance did not 
drop substantially in 2014.13
Second, medical claims increased somewhat more than premiums, reflected in the unad-
justed MLR increase of 1.1 percent overall. Administrative costs (including broker commissions) rose 
only slightly (0.6%) as a percentage of total premiums overall. In the individual market, administra-
tive expense decreased as a percentage of premiums because the modest increase in administrative 
costs was offset by a more substantial increase in premiums. This indicates that insurers were able to 
expand coverage efficiently in 2014.
Because both medical claims and administrative expenses increased more than premiums in 
2014, health insurers’ overall operating profits (known as underwriting gain) diminished noticeably 
from previous years. This was especially pronounced in the individual market, where the 4.2 percent 
underwriting loss was three points greater than the underwriting loss two years earlier. Insurers overall 
showed a small profit margin in 2014 of 1 percent, aided by offsetting gains in the group market, but 
this was well less than half of the profit margin in prior years. This does not include any additional, 
nonoperating profits that insurers earned from investments, which are not reported in this brief. 
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Exhibit 2
Health Insurers’ Financial Performance by Market Segment, 2012–2014
ALL MARKETS 2012 2013 2014 Change from 2012 to 2014
N= 3514 3393 3147
Premium ($ in Billions) $310.5 $310.7 $329.7 6.2%
Percentage-point change 
from 2012 to 2014
Net Medical Claims $270.8 $270.9 $291.1  
% of premium 87.2% 87.2% 88.3% 1.1
Quality Improvement $2.5 $2.5 $2.6  
% of premium 0.8% 0.8% 0.8% 0
Administrative Costs: $28.6 $29.5 $32.2  
% of premium 9.2% 9.5% 9.8% 0.6
Broker Expense $8.4 $8.3 $8.9  
% of premium 2.7% 2.7% 2.7% 0
Other Admin. Cost $20.2 $21.3 $23.3  
% of premium 6.5% 6.9% 7.1% 0.6
Underwriting Gain (Loss) $8.8 $7.8 $3.7  
% of premium 2.8% 2.5% 1.1% –1.7
INDIVIDUAL 2012 2013 2014 Change from 2012 to 2014
N= 1669 1591 1412
Premium ($ in Billions) $30.3 $31.9 $59.7 97%
Percentage-point change 
from 2012 to 2014
Net Medical Claims $25.8 $27.3 $53.4  
% of premium 85.1% 85.6% 89.4% 4.3
Quality Improvement $0.3 $0.3 $0.5  
% of premium 1.0% 0.9% 0.8% –0.2
Administrative Costs: $4.7 $5.3 $8.2  
% of premium 15.5% 16.6% 13.7% –1.8
Broker Expense $1.3 $1.3 $1.8  
% of premium 4.3% 4.1% 3.0% –1.3
Other Admin. Cost $3.4 $4.0 $6.4  
% of premium 11.2% 12.5% 10.7% –0.5
Underwriting Gain (Loss) ($0.4) ($1.0) ($2.5)  
% of premium –1.3% –3.1% –4.2% –2.9
SMALL- AND LARGE- 
GROUP MARKETS 2012 2013 2014 Change from 2012 to 2014
N= 1845 1802 1735
Premium ($ in Billions) $280.2 $278.8 $270.0 –3.6%
Percentage-point change 
from 2012 to 2014
Net Medical Claims $245.0 $243.6 $237.7  
% of premium 87.4% 87.4% 88.0% 0.6
Quality Improvement $2.2 $2.2 $2.1  
% of premium 0.8% 0.8% 0.8% 0
Administrative Costs: $23.9 $24.2 $24.0  
% of premium 8.5% 8.7% 8.9% 0.4
Broker Expense $7.1 $7.0 $7.1  
% of premium 2.5% 2.5% 2.6% 0.1
Other Admin. Cost $16.8 $17.3 $16.9  
% of premium 6% 6.2% 6.3% 0.3
Underwriting Gain (Loss) $9.2 $8.8 $6.2  
% of premium 3.3% 3.2% 2.3% –1.0
Source: Authors’ analysis of data from the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services. Because of rounding, the underwriting gain/loss does not 
always exactly equal premiums minus costs.
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Variability in Financial Performance
Some insurers fared much better than others in the individual market. Exhibit 3 divides credible 
insurers (i.e., those with more than 1,000 members) into three groups, based on quartiles of under-
writing gains or losses.14 For each group (top quartile, bottom quartile, and median), Exhibit 3 shows 
the mean financial performance per member per month, weighted by enrollment. 
Exhibit 3
Individual Market Financial Performance, by Quartiles of  
Gain/Loss Per Member Per Month, 2014
All costs are per member per month
n= 126 252 127  
PMPM* Bottom quartile Median Top quartile Percentage-point change from top to bottom
Premium $346.7 $300.9 $381.9  
Net Medical Claims $364.0 $268.1 $304.7  
% of premium 105.0% 89.1% 79.8% –25.2
Quality Improvement $3.2 $2.6 $3.1  
% of premium 0.9% 0.9% 0.8% –0.1
Administrative Costs: $55.1 $43.4 $41.7  
% of premium 15.9% 14.4% 10.9% –5.0
Broker Expense $9.2 $10.3 $10.1  
% of premium 2.7% 3.4% 2.6% –0.1
Other Admin. Cost $45.9 $33.1 $31.6  
% of premium 13.2% 11.0% 8.3% –5.0
Underwriting Gain (Loss) ($75.6) ($13.2) $32.4  
% of premium –21.8% –4.4% 8.5% 30.3
* Weighted mean values by enrollment within quartiles of gain/loss.
Source: Authors’ analysis of data from the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services.
The best-performing quartile of insurers in the individual market had an 8.5 percent profit 
margin overall in 2014, compared with a 21.8 percent loss by the worst-performing quartile. Net 
medical claims exceeded premiums by 5 percent for insurers in the bottom quartile, whereas in the 
top quartile, medical claims averaged 20 percent less than premiums. Clearly, one insurer’s experience 
does not reflect the others, or the industry, as a whole.
To further understand how the ACA affected insurers in its first full year, we grouped insur-
ers according to whether their profit margins in the individual market increased or decreased from 
2013 to 2014. Restricting the sample to credible insurers with primarily ACA-compliant member-
ship resulted in a sample of 144 insurers across different states. Exhibit 4 indicates how many of these 
made profits both years, suffered losses both years, or switched between profit and loss.
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Exhibit 4








change from  
2013 to 2014
GROUP ONE: 28 insurers (20%) changed from a loss in 2013 to profit in 2014
Total Members 965,127 2,471,478 1,506,351
Medical Loss Ratio 92.8% 81.0% –11.8
Administrative Cost Ratio 12.8% 11.4% –1.4
Profit Margin –5.6% 7.6% 13.2
GROUP TWO: 25 insurers (17%) generated profits in both 2013 and 2014
Total Members 563,536 701,420 137,884
Medical Loss Ratio 80% 82.0% 2.0
Administrative Cost Ratio 15.2% 13.6% –1.6
Profit Margin 4.7% 4.4% –0.3
GROUP THREE: 68 insurers (47%) incurred losses in both 2013 and 2014
Total Members 2,173,857 3,958,517 1,784,660
Medical Loss Ratio 89.9% 96.4% 6.5
Administrative Cost Ratio 18.9% 14.4% –4.5
Profit Margin –8.8% –10.8% –2.0
GROUP FOUR: 23 insurers (16%) changed from profit in 2013 to loss in 2014
Total Members 403,572 683,959 280,387
Medical Loss Ratio 80.8% 100.5% 19.7
Administrative Cost Ratio 15.9% 12.8% –3.1
Profit Margin 3.3% –13.3% –16.6
Source: Authors’ analysis of data from the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services.
Over a third of the total sample (53 insurers, groups 1 and 2) were profitable in 2014; these 
insurers accounted for 41 percent of the total members in this sample (data not shown). The remain-
der were either unprofitable both years or moved from profit to loss. Medical claims, rather than 
administrative costs, were the main driver of the negative financial experiences.
Insurers that turned profitable in 2014 (group 1) saw their medical costs decrease by almost 
12 percentage points as a percentage of premium—that is, their MLR decreased. Coupled with a 
1.4 point decline in the mean administrative cost ratio, these changes resulted in a substantial (13.2-
point) rise in their overall profit margin to 7.6 percent, from a loss of 5.6 percent. In contrast, insur-
ers that reported losses (groups 3 and 4) had substantially higher mean MLRs. Although they man-
aged to reduce their administrative costs significantly, their MLR increased even more, producing a 
mean loss greater than 10 percent.
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CONCLUSION
By subsidizing coverage, establishing insurance exchanges, and making insurance available to people 
with preexisting conditions, the ACA’s reforms changed market conditions in ways that insurers had 
difficulty predicting, at least initially. In 2014, the ACA’s reinsurance program offset much of insurers’ 
underestimated medical claims in the individual market. Also, despite overall losses in the individual 
market, the insurance industry as a whole earned modest operating profits (in addition to profits 
from investments). 
Only some insurers fared especially poorly. One-quarter of insurers underestimated medical 
claims in the individual market to a much greater extent than the rest. A fifth of insurers in the indi-
vidual market substantially improved their financial performance between 2013 and 2014.
All well-functioning markets have winners and losers, so it should be no surprise that some 
health insurers failed to succeed in the ACA’s reformed market, especially during the first year. As 
insurers gain greater experience with these new conditions, it can be expected that their actuarial 
precision will improve and that large differences in financial performance will diminish. Moreover, 
additional market stabilization can be expected as more previously insured people move out of grand-
fathered and transitional plans and into ACA-compliant coverage. 
However, improved financial performance will require increased premiums, especially as the 
ACA’s reinsurance component phases out, starting in 2017. This reinsurance has played a crucial role 
in helping insurers transition. Because this has taken longer than initially expected, policymakers 
should consider extending the ACA’s reinsurance program until the reformed market has matured.
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About This Study
Data were collected from two datasets maintained by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid 
Services (CMS): the unified rate review template (URRT) and medical loss ratio (MLR) data. 
The URRT includes two sections: a market experience section that develops planned 
rates from the insurers’ own prior experience or from industry averages, and the product/plan 
section, which reports projected changes in premiums, expenses, and enrollment for the com-
ing year. In 2016, we identified 543 insurers that did not have deactivated submissions. Insurers’ 
2014 rate filing provided projected information for 2014 and their 2016 filing provided actual 
information for 2014. We excluded health insurer plans with submission status that was “deacti-
vated” or “terminated.”
MLR data were collected from health insurers in 50 states and the District of Columbia, 
but not from the territories. Data for 2014 included claims “run-out” paid through March 
2015, as well as payments for ACA cost-sharing reduction plans. These MLR data captured the 
effects of “the 3 Rs” (reinsurance, risk adjustment, and rate corridor payments), which we further 
adjusted for prorated reductions in actual rate corridor payments. The key financial accounts 
were remapped and recalculated by following the NAIC Supplemental Health Care Exhibit 
definition for net premiums, net incurred claims after reinsurance, and underwriting gain and 
losses. In addition, MLR data provided transitional reinsurance payments made to state insurers 
in 2014. 
In assessing the impact of expanded and mandated coverage of the individual commer-
cial market in 2014, we computed financial ratios (medical loss, administrative cost, and profit 
margin ratios) on 144 credible health insurers (i.e., those with more than 1,000 members) that 
reported financial data from the individual market between 2013 and 2014 and reported 2014 
experience in their URRT 2016 rate filings from plans where at least 50 percent of the member-
ship were in ACA-compliant coverage. 
From the 2014 MLR data, we identified 15.1 million nongroup members from 1,412 
insurers across the states, before any data adjustments for non-ACA-compliant plans. From 2016 
URRT data, we identified 622 insurers, which we merged with the 2014 MLR data. We then 
eliminated deactivated/terminated plans and any plans where more than 50 percent of the mem-
bership were in non-ACA-compliant products. This resulted in 286 insurers, covering 8.1 mem-
bers that had ACA-compliant plans in both 2014 and 2016. We further reduced the sample to 
144 insurers, totaling 7.8 million members, by excluding those that did not report 2013 data and 
that had fewer than 1,000 members. Marketwide and quartile means are weighted by each plan’s 
membership.
In calculating financial measures, we included insurers with any size enrollment and pre-
miums to capture the experience of insurers that were less active and possibly exiting these mar-
kets. For financial measures, we had the following study sample: 
• Individual market = 1,669 in 2012, 1,591 in 2013, and 1,412 in 2014 
• Small-group market = 968 in 2012, 928 in 2013, and 879 in 2014 
• Large-group market = 877 in 2012, 874 in 2013, and 856 in 2014.
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Glossary
Premium: Net adjusted premium earned, including payments for risk adjustment and rate cor-
ridor payments.
Net medical claims: Incurred medical expenses net of reinsurance claims, adjusted for advance 
cost-sharing payment.
Medical loss ratio: Net medical claims plus total quality improvement costs, divided by 
premiums.
Quality improvement expenses: Activities in the following categories: improving health out-
comes, preventing hospital readmissions, improving patient safety and reducing medical errors, 
increasing wellness and promotion, and implementing health information technology. Quality 
improvement expenses are included along with medical expenses in the numerator of the medical 
loss ratio for purposes of calculating rebates owed under the ACA. 
Agent and broker expenses: Usually reported as part of administrative expenses. (In this brief we 
separate out this element.) 
Other administrative costs: All administrative expenses other than agent and broker fees. 
Included are internal sales expenses, claims adjustment costs, and salary and benefit expenses, as 
well as all other general corporate overhead costs.
Administrative cost ratio: Other administrative costs plus agent and broker expenses, divided by 
premiums.
Underwriting gain or loss: Calculated by subtracting all medical, quality improvement, and 
administrative costs from net premium earned. As such, it does not include profit or loss from 
investments or taxes on investments.
Profit margin: Underwriting gain divided by premiums. A negative profit margin indicates that 
medical and administrative costs exceeded premiums. 
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